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Introduction
Financial crises are times of simultaneous increases in risk and great losses in portfolio values. At face value, this basic observation may suggest that the risk-return relation during crisis periods is negative, and thus of opposite sign compared to the classical Merton (1973 Merton ( , 1980 positive risk compensation tradeo¤. Negative volatility-return relations have been suggested in connection with the …nancial leverage and volatility feedback e¤ects. The argument behind the …nancial leverage e¤ect of Black (1976) and Christie (1982) is that an initial price drop increases the debt-equity ratio and hence expected risk. The volatility feedback e¤ect is that increases in risk lead to higher discount rates and thus losses of value, e.g., Campbell & Hentschel (1992) -see also Black (1976, p. 179) . More recently, Ang, Hodrick, Xing & Zhang (2006) have argued for a negative relation between volatility innovations and returns: Since volatility innovations are largest during crisis periods, stocks that comove with volatility pay o¤ in bad states, and should thus require a smaller risk premium. The empirical evidence on these e¤ects has been mixed, both regarding sign and signi…cance, see, e.g., the discussion in Bollerslev & Zhou (2006) and the review by Lettau & Ludvigson (2010) , and there has (to the best of our knowledge) been no systematic investigation of the possible changes in these e¤ects during crisis periods.
In this paper, we show that the basic intuition described above appears to be wrong. Indeed, we show that the empirical relation between return and volatility turns positive exactly during …nancial crises, whereas it is negative or close to zero during normal periods. At the same time, the …nancial leverage e¤ect increases by about 50% in magnitude during crisis periods. These changes are observed whether we focus on the recent subprime crisis or include all major …nancial crises starting with the Great Depression. On the other hand, the same changes in the …nancial e¤ects (the risk-return relation and the leverage e¤ect) are not observed during NBER recessions, suggesting that …nancial crises are somehow special.
We conduct our analysis in the framework of an extended version-with the …nancial parameters potentially changing during crises-of the FIEGARCH-M (or FIEGARCH-inmean) model of Christensen, Nielsen & Zhu (2010) , who generalize the FIEGARCH (fractionally integrated exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model introduced by . Many of the salient features of daily stock returns are well described by the FIEGARCH model. Thus, in addition to time-varying volatility and volatility clustering (the ARCH and GARCH e¤ects, as in Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) ), and the resulting unconditional excess kurtosis or heavier than normal tails, the model accounts for both long memory in volatility (fractional integration, as in the FIGARCH model of Baillie, Bollerslev & Mikkelsen (1996) ) and the leverage e¤ect, i.e., asymmetric volatility reaction to positive and negative return innovations (the exponential feature as in Nelson's (1991) EGARCH model). The FIEGARCH-M introduces a …ltered volatility-in-mean generalization of the FIEGARCH model. The generalization allows a risk-return relation e¤ect of changing conditional volatility on conditional expected stock returns, and generates unconditional skewness. Following recent literature (Ang et al. (2006) and Christensen & Nielsen (2007) ), it is changes in volatility that enter the return equation. The …ltering of volatility when entering it in the return speci…cation implies that the long memory property of volatility (the fractionally integrated feature) does not spill over into returns, which would be theoretically and empirically unwarranted. Christensen et al. (2010) show that the FIEGARCH-M model dominates the original FIEGARCH model according to standard criteria.
Speci…cally, we extend the FIEGARCH-M model to allow for a change in the …nancial parameters, in particular, the volatility-in-mean e¤ect and the leverage e¤ect, during …nancial crises. An application to CRSP value-weighted cum-dividend stock index return series from 1926 through 2010 for the U.S. shows that both …nancial e¤ects increase signi…cantly during crises. Strikingly, the risk-return tradeo¤ is signi…cantly positive only during …nancial crises, and insigni…cant during non-crisis periods. The leverage e¤ect is negative throughout, but increases signi…cantly by about 50% in magnitude during …nancial crises. Again, since no such changes are observed during NBER recessions, …nancial crises are special in this sense. Applications to a number of major developed and emerging international stock markets con…rm the increase in the leverage e¤ect, whereas the international evidence on the risk-return tradeo¤ is mixed.
Our results suggest that a given increase in the debt/equity ratio leads to a greater increase in expected risk during crisis periods than during normal periods. Under the volatility feedback interpretation, the results suggest that a given increase in risk increases the discount rate by more during …nancial crisis than during normal periods. This is consistent with an increase in the (positive) risk-return relation during crises, which is what we also …nd.
It is noteworthy that the empirical results do not stem simply from the fact that …nancial crises are periods of negative returns. Speci…cally, we are not regressing the return (or its sign) on the indicator variable for crisis periods. Rather, it is the coe¢ cient on volatility changes in the return equation that changes during crisis periods, and it does not turn negative (so that increases in risk are associated with the negative returns). Instead, it goes from negative or near zero during normal periods to positive (consistent with the classical equilibrium relation) during crisis periods. This is accompanied by an increase in the …nancial leverage e¤ect, so the combined e¤ect is complicated, and the results far from trivial or expected.
In the next section, we present the FIEGARCH-M model with changing …nancial parameters, which incorporates all the above mentioned features. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
The FIEGARCH-M model with changing …nancial parameters
That volatility exhibits long memory is well established in the recent empirical literature 1 , and …nancial theory may accommodate long memory in volatility as well, see Comte & Renault (1998) . Many of the studies use GARCH-type frameworks, but to the best of our knowledge the only such model that includes a volatility-in-mean speci…cation, i.e., a parametric relation across conditional means and variances, is the FIEGARCH-M model of Christensen et al. (2010) . This model extends the FIEGARCH model of by introducing volatility into the return equation along the lines of the GARCH-M literature, following Engle, Lilien & Robins (1987) . Since long memory in volatility introduced into the return equation in a linear fashion generates long memory in returns, which may not be empirically warranted, it is changes in volatility rather than volatility levels that enter the in-mean speci…cation and induce a volatility-return relation. This follows Ang et al. (2006) and Christensen & Nielsen (2007) .
In this section, we consider an extension of the FIEGARCH-M model to allow for changes in the …nancial parameters, in particular, the volatility-in-mean e¤ect and the …nancial leverage e¤ect, during …nancial crises. Let the daily continuously compounded returns on the stock or stock market index be given by r t = ln(P t ) ln(P t 1 );
(1) where t is the daily time index and P t the stock price or index level at time t. We use the conditional mean speci…cation
where volatility changes enter in the form of h t , de…ned in (5) below as the …ltered (fractionally di¤erenced) conditional variance, and D t is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if a …nancial crisis is ongoing as of t 1 (when the conditional mean is formed), and 0 otherwise. In the original FIEGARCH-M model, 11 = 0, and in the FIEGARCH model, 1 = 11 = 0. Thus, the speci…cation allows for a volatility-return relation through the parameter 1 , and in the extended model of this paper, 11 represents the change in this relation during …nancial crises. It is assumed that D t is in the information set F t 1 at time t 1, i.e., it is known at t 1 whether a …nancial crisis is ongoing at this time, and F t 1 is the -…eld generated by fD t ; r t 1 ; D t 1 ; r t 2 ; D t 2 ; :::g. In our empirical analysis, we experiment with changes in the start dates and end dates of …nancial crises, and document the robustness of our …ndings to such changes. Note that h t is F t 1 -measurable, so the return innovations are " t = r t E(r t jF t 1 ) with E( jF t 1 ) denoting conditional expectation given F t 1 . It follows that " t in (2) is a martingale di¤erence sequence (with respect to F t ).
The conditional return variance is modeled as 2 t = V ar(r t jF t 1 ) = E(" 2 t jF t 1 ):
As in the FIEGARCH-M model, the speci…cation is
with (fractional) volatility changes h t in deviation from long run level de…ned as
where ! is the mean of the logarithmic conditional variance, (L) and (L) are polynomials in the lag operator, (L) = (1 1 L) : : : 1 p L and (L) = (1 + 1 L) : : : 1 + q L , g t is the news impact function described below, and (1 L) d is the fractional di¤erence operator de…ned by its binomial expansion
where d is the order of fractional integration in log-variance and ( ) = R 1 0 x e x dx is the Gamma function. The fractional di¤erence with 0 < d < 1 allows for stronger volatility persistence than that of the GARCH-type generated by the lag-polynomials (L) and (L). To calculate the fractional di¤erences h t , we truncate the in…nite sum in (6) at i = minft 1; 1000g, following Baillie et al. (1996) and .
The …nancial leverage (or exponential or asymmetry) e¤ect is ensured by modeling ln 2 t in (4), as opposed to 2 t , and by the de…nition of the news impact function g t governing the manner in which past returns impact current volatility,
where z t 1 = " t 1 = t 1 is the standardized innovation. For 1 = 0, this is the news impact function from Nelson's (1991) EGARCH speci…cation. Here, is the rate at which the magnitude of the normalized innovations in deviations from mean, i.e., jz t 1 j Ejz t 1 j, enter into current volatility 2 , and 0 generates an asymmetry in news impact on volatility. Thus, if 0 < 0 then negative innovations induce higher volatility than positive innovations of the same magnitude. The asymmetric volatility reaction pattern may stem from a …nancial leverage e¤ect, see e.g. Black (1976) , Christie (1982) , Engle & Ng (1993) , and Yu (2005) . The standard argument from Black (1976) is that bad news decrease the stock price, hence increasing the debt-to-equity ratio (i.e., …nancial leverage). With equity carrying all asset risk, this makes the stock relatively riskier after the price drop and increases expected future volatility. Although asymmetric reaction to innovations of di¤erent sign does not in addition induce unconditional skewness in returns, the latter is instead produced by the in-mean feature (see He, Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008) ) and hence also accommodated by the FIEGARCH-M speci…cation. In the original FIEGARCH-M model, 1 = 0, and in the extended model of this paper, 1 measures the change in the leverage or asymmetry e¤ect during …nancial crises.
Following and Christensen et al. (2010) , our empirical speci…cations actually allow for the e¤ect of lagged returns in the conditional mean equation, as well as lagged volatility-in-mean e¤ects. In addition, we allow for the possibility that it is the news impact itself rather than the volatility change that generates the volatility-in-mean e¤ect. Thus, the FIEGARCH-M h model uses the return equation with volatility changes,
and the FIEGARCH-M g model uses the return equation with news impacts,
Since g t is the most recent innovation to 2 t , and it is F t 1 -measurable, the return innovations in (9) are again the martingale di¤erences " t = r t E(r t jF t 1 ), as in (2). The …nal FIEGARCH model in in fact has p = q = 1. The …nal models in Christensen et al. (2010) use these values, as well as m = 3 in the FIEGARCH-M h case, and m = 2 in the FIEGARCH-M g case.
In our empirical work we exclude nontrading days due to weekends and holidays. Following Nelson (1991) and , we include a variable N t equal to the number of nontrading days between t 1 and t to account for the fact that volatility tends to be higher following weekend and holiday nontrading periods, but with each nontrading day contributing less to volatility than a trading day. 3 Thus, our volatility equation with p = q = 1 becomes
Here, the parameter measures the contribution of each nontrading day to variance, as a fraction of the contribution from a trading day. Thus, the relevant measure of volatility changes h t follows a special ARMA(1,1) process. The presence of h t 1 on the right hand side of (10) is a GARCH-e¤ect, i.e., volatility (here, its fractional di¤erence) depends on its own lag, whereas the ARCH-e¤ect stems from past returns feeding into current volatility, namely, via the news impact g t (and its lagged value) in (10). Using (10) for volatility and either (8) or (9) to de…ne the return innovations " t , the model is estimated by quasi maximum likelihood (QML). Thus, the sample log-likelihood for return data r t ; t = 1; :::; T , is
where = ( 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 11 ; :::; m ; m1 ; !; ; 0 ; 1 ; ; 1 ; :::; q ; 1 ; :::; p ; d) is the unknown parameter vector to be estimated, of dimension p+q +2m+8. Thus, the additional parameters relative to the original FIEGARCH-M model are ( 11 ; :::; m1 ; 1 ). Estimation is carried out by numerical maximization of ln L( ). To initialize the recursions on (10) and (8) respectively (9) we use the unconditional sample average and variance of r t for the presample (t = 0; 1; : : :) values of r t and 2 t , and we use " t = 0 for t = 0; 1; : : :. The distributional assumption behind the likelihood function is that the return innovations " t are conditionally normal. For robustness against departures from Gaussianity, we calculate robust standard errors based on the sandwich-formula H 1 V H 1 , where H is the Hessian of ln L( ) and V the sum of the outer products of the individual quasi score contributions. Christensen et al. (2010) verify the validity of the QML robust standard errors using the wild bootstrap (Wu (1986) ). Table 1 
Empirical results

about here
In our empirical work we consider both the U.S. and a number of developed and emerging economies. Table 1 shows information for each country about the stock market index used, start and end date, sample size, and summary statistics. The countries included are the G-7, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) , and four other selected emerging markets (Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand) . The U.S. data are obtained from CRSP, the Russian data from the RTS Exchange, the data for Argentina, Brazil, France, Italy, Mexico, and South Korea from Global Financial Data, and the rest from Datastream. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have experienced periods of severe in ‡ation, which is re ‡ected in the large average annualized returns in the table. In the subsequent estimations, we apply a 20% truncation rule to the raw daily returns for all countries. This a¤ects Brazil (6 days), Russia (3), China (4), Argentina (15) , Mexico (2), and South Korea (11) . Unreported estimations show that our results are robust to alternative truncation rules, or no truncation at all. Table 2 lists these crises and their start and end dates. The set of relevant …nancial crises and their approximate start and end dates are based on Kindleberger & Aliber (2005) , Longsta¤ (2010) , and Afonso, Kovner & Schoar (2011) . The exact start date used in the empirical analysis is identi…ed as a day with a large drop in the index (typically more than 5%) as close as possible to the approximate start date from the literature. Similarly, the exact end date used is de…ned as the local minimum of the index nearest to the approximate end date. Thus, we de…ne D t = 1 during the crisis periods from Table 2 , and D t = 0 otherwise. For robustness to misspeci…cation of the exact start and end dates of crises, we compare below with results obtained by extending each crisis period by 10% (symmetrically, shifting both start and end date), and also by similarly shortening the crisis by 10%. The results appear in Table 3 . The results in the …rst two columns are for the exact speci…cations of the …nal models from Christensen et al. (2010) , with m = 3 volatility changes h t in-mean in the …rst column, and m = 2 news impacts g t in-mean in the second column. The results are similar to those from Christensen et al. (2010) who used the shorter period ending in 2006. Thus, both the volatility-in-mean and …nancial leverage e¤ects are generally signi…cant at conventional levels (robust asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses). In particular, 0 is negative and strongly signi…cant in both columns. With h t in-mean (…rst column), the e¤ect of the most recent volatility change, 1 , is negative. Here, it is the next two lags of h t that are signi…cant (with opposite signs). With news impact g t in-mean (second column), again the leading term enters negatively, and the second term is signi…cantly positive. All other parameters (the FIEGARCH parameters) are signi…cant, including the memory parameter d, and the Engle & Ng (1993) sign bias and size bias tests (the last four rows of the table) do not indicate misspeci…cation.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the results from the extended model speci…cation allowing changes in the …nancial parameters during crisis periods. Both 11 , the change in the leading volatility-in-mean term, and 1 , the change in the …nancial leverage e¤ect, are statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. This is both for the case with volatility changes in-mean (third column of the table) and with news impact in-mean (fourth column). The change in the volatility-in-mean e¤ect is positive in both speci…cations. Indeed, the change is so great that the in-mean e¤ect at the …rst lag, 1 + 11 , turns positive during …nancial crises, whereas it is negative (and insigni…cant) during noncrisis periods, as it is in the model with constant parameters (Table 3 ). Furthermore, the …nancial leverage e¤ect is strengthened during crisis periods in both speci…cations. The e¤ect is always present, i.e., 0 is negative, but the combined leverage e¤ect 0 + 1 during …nancial crises is stronger, i.e., 1 < 0. From the point estimates, the leverage e¤ect is about 50% greater in magnitude during …nancial crises, which is considerable, and the di¤erence is signi…cant.
Table 4 about here
To verify the robustness of our …ndings, we carry out a number of investigations. Henceforth, we report only results for the speci…cation with h t in-mean, but similar results are obtained in the alternative speci…cation with g t in-mean. Table 4 shows the results. The …rst two columns use the alternative de…nitions of the crisis indicator D t , with crisis periods extended and shortened by 10% in columns one and two, respectively. It is clear from the table that the exact de…nition of the start and end dates of each crisis are not important for the overall conclusion that the volatility-in-mean and …nancial leverage e¤ects increase during crisis periods. Indeed, the volatility-in-mean e¤ect that is insigni…cant outside crisis periods is an order of magnitude larger and signi…cantly positive during …nancial crises.
The third column of Table 4 instead sets D t = 1 during o¢ cial NBER recessions, and 0 otherwise. From the results, there are no signi…cant changes in the …nancial parameters and during NBER recessions. This veri…es that there is something special about …nancial crises. It is during …nancial crises, as opposed to general economic downturns, that the riskreturn tradeo¤ and leverage e¤ects change-indeed, with the risk-return tradeo¤ insigni…cant outside …nancial crisis periods.
Finally, out of current interest, the last column of Table 4 shows the results of including only the recent subprime crisis, i.e., D t = 1 from December 3, 2007, to March 9, 2009, and D t = 0 otherwise. Again, the change parameters are large in magnitude and strongly signi…cant, with robust asymptotic t-statistics of 8:2 for the increase 11 in the volatility-inmean e¤ect, and 6:8 for the strengthening of the …nancial leverage e¤ect. This shows that the changes are not speci…c to the earlier crises in the data period. Next, we investigate to which extent the results carry over to other countries. We consider in turn the remaining G-7 countries, the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) , and four additional major emerging markets in the respective regions (Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand) . Of course, for each country analyzed, the set of …nancial crises should be reconsidered. Table 5 shows the list of crises included for each country. In addition to the previous literature references, we also consulted Radelet & Sachs (1998) , Desai (2000) , and Reinhart & Rogo¤ (2009) for selection and dating of the country speci…c crises. Due to the shorter time series of daily returns available for these countries, we report only the results for a parsimonious FIEGARCH-M speci…cation with m = 1 volatility-inmean term, but similar results (although not always signi…cant) are obtained for larger values of m. Results for the remaining six G-7 countries appear in Table 6 . For all countries, the basic FIEGARCH parameters are similar to those for the US. Regarding the special …nancial parameters and , the positive sign of the change in the former during crises, as seen in the U.S. results, extends to all countries except Italy and Japan, although the changes are mostly statistically insigni…cant. The strengthening of the …nancial leverage e¤ect during crises extends to all countries, although it is insigni…cant in Canada and the U.K. Interestingly, as the only country, Italy has no leverage e¤ect during noncrisis periods, i.e., 0 is insigni…cant although negative. However, the change during crisis periods, 1 , is negative and much larger in magnitude than for the other countries, so that the combined e¤ect 0 + 1 is similar. Table 7 . The evidence on the risk-return tradeo¤ is mixed and mostly insigni…cant. On the other hand, by the point estimates, the leverage e¤ect is present both during and outside crisis periods, but it is stronger during crises, i.e., both 0 and 1 are negative throughout. The leverage change parameter 1 is large in magnitude and signi…cant for China and Russia. Also 0 is signi…cant for Russia. Thus, the results so far suggest that the leverage e¤ect is always negative, and stronger during …nancial crises. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduce an extension of the fractionally integrated exponential GARCHin-mean (FIEGARCH-M) model for daily stock return data with long memory in return volatility of Christensen et al. (2010) and show that it delivers interesting and novel empirical results regarding …nancial crises. Our new extension of the model allows for a change in the …nancial parameters, in particular, the volatility-in-mean e¤ect and the leverage e¤ect, during …nancial crises.
Our application to CRSP value-weighted cum-dividend stock index return series from 1926 through 2010 for the U.S. shows that both …nancial e¤ects increase signi…cantly during crises. Strikingly, the risk-return tradeo¤ is signi…cantly positive only during …nancial crises, and insigni…cant during non-crisis periods. The leverage e¤ect is negative throughout, but increases signi…cantly by about 50% in magnitude during …nancial crises. No such changes are observed during NBER recessions, so in this sense …nancial crises are special.
All in all, although the results are generally stronger for the U.S. than for each of the other countries, perhaps due to more crises and better data availability, some conclusions emerge from combining the results from a number of major developed and emerging international stock markets. Regarding the risk-return tradeo¤, the parameters are mainly positive in the Asian economies, whereas they are insigni…cant in Latin America. For the leverage parameters, , the results are very strong and show that the leverage e¤ect is negative throughout, and considerably stronger during …nancial crises-as in the U.S., again by about 50% in magnitude in most countries.
It is conceivable that our estimated leverage e¤ect in fact measures a volatility feedback e¤ect. Like the leverage e¤ect, the volatility feedback e¤ect induces a negative relation between risk and price, provided risk compensation is positive: Increased risk and a positive risk-return relation increases the discount rate and hence induces a price drop. This is consistent with what happens during crisis periods, and with our …ndings that the negative relation (leverage, or volatility feedback) is so markedly stronger when the risk-return relation sets in-exactly during …nancial crises. Note: This table reports summary statistics for the market index used for each country.
For each index, we provide the index name, the start and end dates, as well as the sample size (the number of daily observations). We also report the annualized average return, the annualized standard deviation (both in norminal terms), and the JB normality test statistics. denotes signi…cance at 1% level. Note: QML estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Also reported are ln L( ), the value of the maximized log-likelihood function, and the Akaike and Schwarz (or Bayesian) information criteria, respectively. The values of the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic for up to K'th order serial dependence in the standardized residuals," t =^ t , and the absolute standardized residuals, j" t =^ t j, are denoted Q K and Q A K , respectively. and denote rejection at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: QML estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Also reported are ln L( ), the value of the maximized log-likelihood function, and the Akaike and Schwarz (or Bayesian) information criteria, respectively. The values of the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic for up to K'th order serial dependence in the standardized residuals," t =^ t , and the absolute standardized residuals, j" t =^ t j, are denoted Q K and Q A K , respectively. and denote rejection at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: This table presents the crisis list for other countries. The symbols "X"and "-"denote the inclusion and exclusion, respectively, of a crisis. We do not include the 2000 dotcom and the 2001-9-11 attack crises for the BRIC and other emerging markets, since these two crises mainly a¤ect the developed markets. In some cases, inclusion of a crisis is precluded by the length of the time series for the given country. We also list country-speci…c crises for each country, if any. For the …rst four crises (1973 oil crisis, 1987 stock market crash, 2000 dotcom, and 2001-9-11 attack) the crisis start and end dates are the same as for the U.S. market. Note: QML estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Also reported are ln L( ), the value of the maximized log-likelihood function, and the Akaike and Schwarz (or Bayesian) information criteria, respectively. The values of the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic for up to K'th order serial dependence in the standardized residuals," t =^ t , and the absolute standardized residuals, j" t =^ t j, are denoted Q K and Q A K , respectively. and denote rejection at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
